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ENJOINING THE USE OF NATIONAL TRADEMARK RIGHTS
TO PARTITION THE EEC: APPLICATION OF ARTICLES 36 AND 85
I. Introduction
It is generally held that the primary function of a trademark is to identify the
origin of a product and distinguish it from other products of the same type.'
Trademarks have their origin in the tort of passing-off or unfair competition,
that is, in the fundamental rule that no man
has the right to put his goods up
2
for sale as the goods of another person.
In distinguishing the origin of goods, the trademark serves to protect the owner's
goodwill from the deceptive acts of competing parties.
Yet deception is to be avoided not only in the interest of the trademark
owner, but also in the interest of the consumer.' As Rudolph Callmann stated,
the trademark "assures the public that goods bearing the same mark are similar
in nature, quality or characteristics." 4 Thus the consumer relates the trademark
to what he likes or dislikes.' When he enters the market place he uses trademarks
to identify and distinguish the products he wishes to purchase, being reasonably
assured that his purchase under a particular mark is the genuine item that has
proved satisfactory to him in the past.6
The dual function of the trademark appears both simple and straightforward. It also appears, initially, that the trademark's function can well be served
by existing national laws which provide for actions of infringement or unfair
competition against those who seek to market imitations of trademarked goods.
However, when viewed against the realities of international commerce, the
traditional methods of implementing and protecting the trademark function are
quickly thrown open to question.
Since trademark rights have invariably been creatures of state or national
legislation, there has been a tendency for businesses to rely on national trademark
rights to artificially control the flow of goods between countries. Thus, a trademark owner who holds rights to the same mark in several countries will assert
his rights in one such country to oppose imports marketed in another country by
1 See 2 S.LADAS, PATENTS,

TRADEMARKS AND RELATED RIGHTS

§ 732, at 1341 (1975)

[hereinafter cited as LADAS].
2 Id.
3 1 M. HANDLER, TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF ANTITRUST 646-47 (1973); Note, Trademarks
-Likelihood of Confusion and the Public Interest, 20 WAYNE L. REV. 1205 (1974).
4 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES
§ 19(1) (d), at 640 (3d ed. 1967). See Mendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 520 (1888) where it
was said that a trademark affords assurance that the product is genuine and possesses a certain
degree of excellence. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1970). For the effect of this section on
reassurance of the consuming public as to the quality of goods produced by a "related company"
under the particular mark, see LADAS § 747, at 1390.
5 See Hanak, The Quality Assurance Function of Trademarks, 43 FORDHAm L. REv. 363,

364 (1974).
6 See Mak, Trademarks and the European Common Market, 6 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF
INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW [I.I.C.] 29, 32 (1975). Mr. Mak does, however,
imply that the guarantee function of the trademark is subsidiary to the function of indicating
origin. Id. at 32-36. See LADAs § 747, at 1388.
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the owner himself or by those using the mark under his authorization.' In this
way, the owner will attempt to use the national compartmentalization of his
trademark rights to create a division of markets for his branded goods.
Those nations which have perhaps been most affected by this manipulation
of trademark laws are the vigorous trading countries of Western Europe. Nine
of these countries now form the European Economic Community (EEC). The
goal of the EEC is to break down the political and economic barriers between
Member States and promote the integration of a European common market.8
To further this goal the European Court (EEC Court) and Commission have
expanded their interpretation of Community law in an attempt to prevent the
enforcement of national trademark rights from inhibiting the free movement
of goods and free competition within the Community.
Unfortunately, however, these EEC institutions have been suffering from
territorial myopia. In their attempts to thwart the competitively undesirable
exercise of trademark rights, they have sometimes exaggerated trivial links
between foreign companies9 and ignored variations in product quality and
composition." There is some indication that the EEC is moving away from this
trend, 1 but as several cases demonstrate, the Court of Justice and the Commission have often ignored the trademark's important function of indicating
origin and ensuring quality.
The EEC's unique and limited application of the trademark right has made
it increasingly important for lawyers representing multinational enterprises to be
familiar with Community case law on this matter. The fact that two of the EEC's
most recent trademark cases 2 have involved foreign subsidiaries of American
corporations further serves to emphasize the importance to the American bar of
an analysis of this area of foreign law. This note will seek to provide an understanding of the EEC's trademark doctrine as it has evolved under Articles 85
and 3613 of the Treaty of Rome, the governing law of the Common Market.
In examining this area the discussion will necessarily begin with the requisite
elements of an Article 85 violation. Next will be an exploration of the EEC's
application of Article 85 in its attempts to deny unwarranted assertion of national
trademark rights. Following this examination, and a comment on the inadequacy
of Article 85 to eliminate certain instances of trademark protection, the EEC's
7 These actions are justified by trademark owners under the so-called principle of territoriality. According to this theory, "the protection of a trademark in a certain country
depends exclusively on the law of that country, and . . . the effects of a trademark ownership
by use or registration in a country do not reach beyond the borders of that country." LADAS
§ 732, at 1340.
8 See, e.g., J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAW OF THE E.E.C. 39-41 (1973), and
note 15 infra.
9 See Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A. G., [1974 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8230 [hereinafter cited as Hag].
10 See Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CoMM. MKT. REP. '(CCH)
V 8101 [hereinafter cited as Sirena].
11 See Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V., [1974 Transfer Binder] COMM. MKT. REP.
(CCH)
8247 [hereinafter cited as Centrafarm. For a critical analysis of this case see V.
KORAH, COMPETITION LAW OF BRITAIN AND THE COIMON MARKET 225-26 '(1975).
12 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., CoMM. MscT. REP. (CCH) 1 8350
(1976); Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder] CoirMM. MKT. REP. (CCH)
8247.
13 Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 29, 47-48. Articles of the EEC Treaty will be cited
without further reference. The provisions of the Treaty and implementing regulations may be
found in the CCH COMMON MARKET REPORTER [hereinafter cited as CCH].
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subsequent shift to reliance on Article 36 and the principle of free movement to
thwart such undesirable protection will be outlined. Finally, comment will be
offered on the EEC's interpretation of these two articles of the Treaty of Rome
in light of the dual function which trademarks have traditionally been thought to
fulfill.
Prior to analyzing the EEC's approach toward international trademark
problems, it is important to have a general understanding of the Community's
goals and operations. The EEC was formed in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome. 4
This agreement sought to achieve economic growth and stability within Western
Europe by establishing a common market and harmonizing the economic policies
of the Member States." Such tasks were entrusted to several institutions," two of
which have figured prominently in the development of Community trademark
law: the European Court of Justice (EEC Court) and the EEC Commission.
The EEC Court has automatic jurisdiction over questions of Treaty interpretation which arise in the final courts of appeal in the Member States." Consequently, when an Article 85 or Article 36 question is involved in any final national decision, the proceedings in the national court are stayed while the Treaty
issues are referred to the EEC Court. In addition, the lower courts of Member
States may, if they so desire, submit questions concerning Treaty interpretation
directly to the EEC Court.'
The Commission, on the other hand, is primarily an executive organ of the
Community. 9 It does, however, have limited jurisdiction to determine whether
the trade competition provisions of the Treaty contained in Article 85 are being
violated.20 Thus, if national trademark rights are being used by their holders to
partition the Common Market in violation of these Treaty provisions, the Commission may order the individuals to end such activities. 2 In essence, the Commission will require a local trademark holder to withdraw an infringement or
unfair competition suit against one who imports similarly marked competing
goods. The Commission's decisions, however, are normally appealable to the
22
EEC Court on issues of law.
II. Article 85's Prohibition Against The Exercise of National Trademark Rights
The EEC's trademark decisions have focused primarily on two articles of
the Treaty of Rome: Article 85, which provides for free competition, and Article
36, which deals with the free movement of goods within the Community. In addition to being more familiar to members of the American bar, 3 the antitrust
14
bourg
EEC.
15
16
17
18
19

Article 1. The original Member States were Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemand the Netherlands. In 1973, Denmark, Ireland and Great Britain also joined the
Article 2.
Article 4.
Article 177.
Id.
J. CUNNINGHAM, THE COMPETITION LAw

OF

THE E.E.C. 40 (1973).

20 Article 89.
21 See id.; CCH 2422.01 (1971).
22 Article 173. A brief explanation of this article is found in CCH 114636.04 (1971).
23 See generally 3 R. CALLMANN, THE LAw OF UNFAIR CoMPETITION, TRADEMARKS
MONOPOLIES § 101.2 (3d ed. 1967); LADAS §§ 742-45.
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principles embodied in Article 85 were the first to be used by the Community
in striking down unwarranted instances of national trademark protection.24
Consequently, the EEC's application of these laws on free competition will
form the initial focus of this discussion.
Article 85(1) prohibits
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings, and concerted practices which may affect trade between Member
States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition within the Common Market, and in particular
those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment. . ... '
Subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the article clearly indicate the antitrust nature of
its provisions. If an agreement is found to violate those provisions, it is automatically void under Article 85 (2) ."2
A. Effect on Trade Between Member States: A JurisdictionalRequirement
As provided in the Treaty, three elements must exist before an alleged
Article 85 violation can be sustained. First, there must be some form of agreement or concerted action between undertakings; second, the agreement must have
the potential of affecting trade between Member States; and third, the agreement must have the object or effect of inhibiting competition within the Community. Despite this particular ordering of elements within the text of the
article, it is clearly the second requirement that is the initial concern of the Court
or Commission in any Article 85 case. In order to violate the competition article,
a trademark agreement involving the licensing or assignment of a mark must
have the potential of affecting trade between Member States. This is a jurisdictional hurdle which must be met before Community antitrust law is applicable.27 Generally, there must be a showing that it is possible for the particular
agreement to affect the flow of imports and exports between EEC countries. 8
In the trademark area this required effect refers to an influence on imports
and exports marketed under a particular brand name. Thus, if a manufacturer
in one Member State seeks to ensure exclusive national territories for his distributors in other Member States through the use of separate trademark assignments, these agreements will have a potential effect on trade between the States. 9
This effect arises because each assignee may have the right, under the national
24 Hunnings, Patents, Trade Marks, Copyright, 1974 J. Bus. L. 321. See Grundig &
Consten v. EEC Comm'n., 5 COMM. MKT. L.R. 418 (1966).
25 See note 13 supra.
26 id.
27 See, e.g., Grundig & Consten v. EEC Comm'n., 5 CoMMs. Mr. L.R. 418, 472 (1966);
General Motors Continental N.V. v. Comm'n, [1975 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8320, at
7741 (opinion of the Advocate General).
28 See Grundig & Consten v. EEC Comm'n., 5 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 418, 472 (1966).
29 5 COMM. MKT. L.R. 418 (1966).
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trademark law of his particular state, to restrain "infringing" imports of identically branded goods marketed abroad by the assignor or other assignees. Similarly, the local assignee may be prevented from freely exporting to another
assignee's country, because the latter individual would be in a position to maintain an infringement action against him. Of course, a potential effect on trade
may also exist when both the assignor and the assignee of a mark are manufacturers." In such a situation as well, enforcement of one party's local trademark rights will affect importation and exportation of identically branded goods
produced in various other countries.
Of particular importance is that the requisite effect on trade need not be
prejudicial in all respects in order to bring the agreement within the scope of
Article 85.1 In Grundig & Consten v. EEC Commission,32 for example, a
German manufacturer had granted exclusive trademark rights to its French distributor. In the course of its discussion on Article 85, the EEC Court intimated
that the flow of the manufacturer's products into France might well be increased by the exclusive assignment. 3 This, in turn, could help to stimulate
imports of competing brands into France from other Member States, thus promoting interbrand competition. However, the Court held that if, as a consequence of the exclusive assignment, the French distributor was restrained from
reselling his imported goods abroad and foreign distributors were prohibited from
bringing the same German product onto the French market, then, obviously, an
effect on intrabrandtrade between States existed. 4 Such a restrictive effect on
purely intrabrand competition is sufficient to meet the first condition of Article
85. Even in these situations, freedom of trade is impaired in such a way as to endanger the achievement of a single European market.
Analogous to the typical American federal jurisdictional requirement of
"interstate commerce," Article 85 requires that the trade which is affected be
between Member States.3 Consequently, only trademark agreements which have
inter-member effects will come under EEC scrutiny. An agreement between a
manufacturer and distributor in the same Member State, whereby the former
assigns to the latter all of his trademark rights for that state, would not in itself
have the necessary effect on trade. Though it might affect or distort intrabrand
trade within a single national market, it would not have the potential of affecting
imports and exports within the EEC. In such a situation, then, the agreement
would not meet the jurisdictional requirements for application of Article 85.
Similarly, it has been argued that trade between Member States is not
affected if trademark agreements are used by two parties to split a world market
into a European and a non-European territory. 7 In this situation, all EEC
30 See Sirena, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
8101.
31 See Grundig & Consten v. EEC Comm'n., 5 Comis. MKT. L.R. 418, 472 (1966).
32 5 CoMM. MKT. L.R. 418 (1966).
33 Id. at 472.
34 Id. at 472-73.
35 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
36 Cf. Photo-Radio--Club v. Nicolas & Societe Brandt, CCH U 8011 (1963) (Court of
Amiens, France), aff'd, CCH f 8026 (1964) (Cass. crim.) [exclusive distribution agreement
between local wholesaler and retailers, having no extra-territorial effects, does not fall under
Article 85].
37 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., CCH U 8350, at 7350-55 (1976)
(written observations submitted by the Danish, French, Irish and British governments).
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trademark rights would still be under the control of one party to the agreement.
That party's use of those rights to exclude similarly branded goods originating
from the non-European party, together with the latter's reciprocal actions, would
only affect trade between the Community and third countries. The EEC Court
has noted, however, that if the party with the non-European trademark rights
also operates sales subsidiaries within various EEC nations, the requisite effect
on trade might then be present.' This conclusion is premised on the notion that
nonexercise of the European party's rights, pursuant to its ownership of the
common mark, would result in the importation and marketing in the EEC of
such goods by the outsider, through its EEC based subsidiaries. The subsidiaries, in turn, could import and export these goods between their respective
Member States. If, however, subsequent to the division of the world rights to
the mark, the European party chooses to exercise his rights, the outsider's
European subsidiaries can be restrained from marketing the goods under the
same brand as their European competitor. Thus, the inter-member trade which
the subsidiaries might have carried on under the common mark is obviously precluded. In this case, then, the restrictive world trademark agreement would meet
the jurisdictional requirements of Article 85 by having a potential effect on trade
between Member States. 9
B. The Object or Effect of Restricting Competition
The second prerequisite for a violation of Article 85 is that the particular
agreement or concerted practice have as its "object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market. . . ."o As

a preliminary matter, it should be noted that in the trademark area it is intrabrand competition on which the EEC has focused. 4 When a foreign manufacturer grants exclusive national trademark rights to independent manufacturers
or distributors in each of the Member States, its assignees are not thereby absolutely protected from competition. They must still compete with manufacturers
or distributors of other brands.4 2 Yet such competing brands may not always be
identical, and, in some instances, when the differences are technical, it may be
difficult for consumers to assess the relative value of different brands.4 Thus
"purchasers cannot rely generally on a comparison of the offers and especially of
the prices of their suppliers, except for articles of the same mark."4 4 Intrabrand
competition is therefore seen as instrumental in giving the consumer a true choice.
Pursuant to Article 85, if an agreement has either the "object or the effect"
of restricting such competition, it will be prohibited. If this provision is interpreted literally, the requirements of "object or effect" can be read in the dis38 Id. at 7363.
39 Id.
40 See text accompanying note 25 supra.
41 See, The Agreement of Grundig VERKAUFS-GmbH, 3 CoMM. MKT. L. R. 489
(1964) [hereinafter cited as Grundig I], aff'd in part sub nom. Grundig & Consten v. EEC
Comm'n., 5 CoiM. MKT. L.R. 418 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Grundig II]. These cases are
well summarized and critiqued in KORAH, supra note 11, at 178-82.
42 See generally Grundig I, 3 COMM. MKT. L.R. 489, 495-96 (1964).
43 Id. at 496.
44 Id.
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junctive; only one element need be established to find a violation. Recognizing
this disjunctive interpretation, the European Court of Justice originally applied
Article 85 with an emphasis on the object or intent element.
In Grundig & Consten v. EEC Commission45 this literal application of the
antitrust law seemed quite appropriate. Grundig, a German manufacturer of
electronic equipment, had granted an exclusive dealership in France to Consten.
To ensure this exclusivity, the two parties entered into an additional agreement
authorizing Consten to obtain French registration for the mark GINT.4" Consten
had been authorized previously to use the name and symbol of GRUNDIG, the
primary trademark. Under the later agreement, however, Consten became the
registered owner of the secondary GINT mark, which accompanied all Grundig
products. Consten therefore had the ability to assert its national trademark rights
to prohibit genuine imports brought into France by third parties.47
When Consten later brought suit against a parallel importer for unfair
competition and trademark infringement, the defendant argued that the distributorship agreement and the trademark arrangement were void under Article
85. The case went to the Commission and ultimately to the Court of Justice. In
deciding for the defendant, the Court noted that vertical agreements tending to
restrict intrabrand competition among distributors are prohibited by Article 85.48
Without fully analyzing the anticompetitive effects of the instant agreements, the
Court concluded that it "is superfluous to take account of the concrete effects of
an agreement once it appears that it has the object of restricting ...

competi-

tion."49 The object of the agreements, the insulation of the French market from
any intrabrand competition on the wholesale level, was easily discerned from the
exclusive nature of the distributorship contract and the protection offered by
the ancillary trademark agreement."0 Consequently, the two agreements were
held to violate Article 85 and the French distributor was enjoined from opposing
parallel imports through the use of its French trademark rights.
Thus, under the EEC Court's original interpretation of Article 85, trademark agreements were violative merely because their object, regardless of their
effect, was anticompetitive. This emphasis on the object or intent of the parties
to an agreement is particularly appropriate for analyzing international trademark arrangements, since the mere ownership of the same trademark in different
countries by different proprietors automatically creates a division of markets. 5 '
While such diverse ownership may exist for any number of justifiable reasons, it
may also, of course, be intentionally designed to eliminate competition. As in the
United States,52 then, an examination of the object of such an agreement should
be important for establishing an antitrust case. In light of the parties' obvious
5 Corer. MxT. L.R. 418 (1966).
"Grundig International."
See Grundig I, 3 Comiei. MKT. L.R. 489, 494-95 (1964).
Grundig II, 5 Co~m. MxT. L.R. 418, 469-70 (1966).
Id. at 473 *(emphasis added).
Id. at 473-74.
51 LADAS § 741, at 1364.
52 See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598-99 (1951), afl'g
and modifying 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1950). See generally 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADENiARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 15.5 (3d ed. 1967).
45
46
47
48
49
50
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intent, in Grundig, to misuse the mark for an illegal purpose, the Court's decision
met with widespread approval. 3
The Court's subsequent handling of an international trademark assignment,
however, was not nearly so well accepted. 4 In Sirena S.r.l. v. Eda GmbH,5 the
Court emphasized the effect rather than the object of a simple trademark assignment in determining that Article 85 had been infringed. There the plaintiff and
defendant were, respectively, the Italian and German assignees of trademark
rights owned by an American company. When the German defendant exported
its branded goods into Italy, the plaintiff sued in the Italian courts for infringement of its national trademark rights. The defendant responded by alleging that
the Italian competitor was using the mark in violation of the antitrust provisions
of the Treaty of Rome. 6
In dealing with this case the European Court of Justice recognized that
"[t]he trademark right, as a statutory right, does not in itself carry the elements
of contract or concert required by Article 85......' The exercise of the right,
however, could violate the antitrust provision if such use was the object, means,
or result of an agreement. Since the Italian plaintiff in Sirena had originally
gained its rights through an assignment, the required element of "agreement"
was present."8
Thus, the remaining and primary inquiry was whether or not the trademark
assignment had an anticompetitive object or effect. Once this question had been
posed in such terms, however, the failure of the plaintiff's action was a foregone
conclusion. As noted earlier, the ownership of the same mark in different
countries by different individuals may automatically partition the international
market. 9 Thus, a trademark assignment to an enterprise in one Member State
has the inevitable result of enabling the assignee to exclude imports from other
Member States. Given this particular effect, the Sirena Court broadly stated
that:
Article 85 . . . applies if the importation of products coming from different

Member States and carrying the same trademark is prevented by invoking
the trademark right, where the owners of the trademark acquired this mark
or the right to use it under agreements between them or agreements with
third parties.60
In short, the Court's unqualified language" held that the simple anticompetitive
effect of a trademark assignment, regardless of its object, would constitute an
53 LADAS § 741, at 1367.
54 See generally id. § 741A; KORAH, supra note 11, at 217-18.
55 [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH 8101.
56 The defendant alleged violations of both Articles 85 and 86. The Article 85 discussion
was the focal point of the Court's ruling and the cause of much controversy. With regard to
Article 86, the provision outlawing the abuse of a "dominant market position," the Court
simply stated that the article does not imply that a trademark owner automatically has a dominant position by virtue of his ability to exclude identically marked imports. Since the Sirena
case, there has been little discussion of Article 86 in relation to trademark abuses.
57 [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8101, at 7112.
58 Id.
59 See text accompanying note 51 supra.
60 [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8101, at 7112.
61 See generally LADAS § 741A.
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Article 85 violation. Such would be the result despite the fact, noted above, that
national trademark assignments to separate holders in separate countries are inherently anticompetitive, in the sense that they can always result in a de facto
division of national markets.
The Court's narrow emphasis on these anticompetitive effects of a trademark
assignment had been opposed by several groups in their earlier recommendations
on the case. Prior to the final decision, the Commission had urged the Court not
to apply Article 85, since there was no showing of an anticompetitive purpose in
the agreement. 2 The Commission also implied that the primary effect of the
trademark assignment in Sirena, the mere transfer of ownership in a mark, was
not a prohibited effect under the Community's competition doctrine. While
trademark rights could be employed in violation of Article 85, such infringements
occurred only when the rights were exercised in an abusive manner, i.e., if the
mark were used for purposes not within the assignment or if used "to produce a
result similar to that of the prohibited cartels.""3 In urging a decision different
from that reached in Grundig, the two cases were sharply distinguished by the
Commission. In the Grundig case the basic agreement, an exclusive distributorship contract, was simply augmented by a trademark agreement. The sole purpose of both arrangements was the guarantee of territorial protection from competition. In Sirena, however, the trademark agreement merely involved a transfer
of an intangible asset with no apparently abusive elements surrounding it.
The Court of Justice, however, rendered its controversial decision despite
these arguments. In doing so, it seemed to rely most heavily on the specific
wording of Article 85: the prohibition of agreements having the "object or
effect" of restricting competition. The assignment of the national trademark
rights in Sirena constituted the necessary agreement. One of the effects of that
agreement was the plaintiff-assignee's ability to assert its trademark rights to
prohibit identically marked imports marketed by foreign assignees or by the
foreign assignor itself. This prohibitive effect would restrict intrabrand competition, 4 so to that extent Article 85 could be said to apply.
The language in the Sirena opinion suggested that it might no longer be of
any importance to the Court that an assignment agreement did not have the
object of restricting competition. ' "[I]t is enough for it to have had this effect,
for it to have this consequence, for it to create a legal situation of a kind tending
to obstruct parallel imports."0 " Since many unqualified assignments of national
trademark rights to individuals throughout the Community could have this inherent effect, the scope of Article 85's application seemed incredibly vast.
Fortunately for European trademark assignees, though, it appears that the
European Court did not intend the sweeping attack against international trademark assignments which Sirena seemed to indicate. In a subsequent Article 85
assault against another trademark assignment, 7 the Advocate General, an in62
63
64
65
66
67

[1971-1973 Transfer Binder]
Id. at 7110.
See text accompanying note
See LADAS § 741A, at 1370.
Hag, [1974 Transfer Binder]
Hag, [1974 Transfer Binder]

CCH

8101, at 7109-10.

51 supra.
CCH fT8230, at 9129 (opinion of the Advocate General).
CCH
8230.
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fluential member of the Court who summarizes the issues for the other judges,"8
urged that the unqualified language in the Sirena decision had stretched the application of the article too far. In his view, Sirena clearly should not be read as
allowing Article 85 to apply to every international assignment agreement within
the EEC. By its very nature such an assignment agreement confers on the
transferee the prerogatives held by the transferor, 9 including the right to bar
infringing goods. Thus it is entirely proper that the ordinary assignee be allowed
to assert national trademark rights against items bearing identical trademarks,
even if such marks are acquired from a common assignor.
Consequently, the Advocate General argued that the broad language of the
Sirena decision should be tempered by some of the facts which allegedly surrounded the case,"0 although the Court itself did not address those elements. In
Sirena the defendant had apparently presented evidence of anticompetitive intent
on the part of the Italian assignee and the American assignor. A letter between
the two parties indicated that the Italian assignee may have been relying on the
existence of parallel assignment contracts throughout the EEC to ensure protection of its own market. 7 1 Thus, it seems that the Sirena decision may have been
based on more than the effects of the agreement embodied in the simple assignment contract, and, therefore, did not constitute the break with prior Article 85
interpretations which it initially appeared to be.72 As in Grundig, there was
evidence of an anticompetitive object or intent manifested in other agreements
or concerted practices involving the assignor and the assignees.
The European Court of Justice, however, has yet to qualify its opinion and,
thus, the question as to the breadth of Article 85's application remains unanswered
today. It cannot be said whether that provision will continue to apply to simple
national trademark assignments which have an inherently restrictive effect on
intrabrand competition but are unaccompanied by evidence of any illicit intent.
However, as later analysis will show, even if the Court's interpretation of Article
85 proves to be more conservative than Sirena would indicate, the Court's more
recent application of Article 36 may well obviate the necessity for any broad
powers under the antitrust provisions of the Treaty. 2
C. Implementation of Article 85 Through Injunctive Relief
Whether Article 85 applies to a particular trademark agreement depends
on a successful showing of the necessary elements that have been outlined above.
68 KORAH, supra note 11, at 172. The Advocate General renders his view on the issues
before the Court delivers its decision. Usually his expressions are more encompassing than those
of the Court. As Korah notes, id., the Advocate General
should consider all the issues, even if one would dispose of the case, since he may not
be followed on that point. Moreover, his opinion may influence the Court and does not
bind it later, so it is the practice to give fuller reasons, and cite the earlier cases. He
performs some of the functions of a judge of first instance, providing a reasoned
opinion, on which the final court can base its decision, even if it does not follow it.
69 [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH ff 8230, at 9129 (opinion of the Advocate General).
70 Id.
71 Id. This letter and its contents are referred to in Sirena only by the Advocate General.
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
8101, at 7117.
72 See LADAS § 741A.
73 See text accompanying notes 145-50 infra.
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How the article actually functions to end a trademark abuse, however, presents a
different question, the answer to which is not immediately apparent in all factual
situations. The second section of Article 85 perfunctorily states that agreements
prohibited therein are null and void. Yet it must be noted that the nullification
of an anticompetitive agreement authorizing the registration or assignment of a
trademark may not, in fact, impair the trademark owner's national rights. The
registration itself may still be valid under national law, as in Grundig 4 or the
trademark rights, originally gained through assignment, may now be founded on
elements of law or fact other than the initial agreement, i.e., later registration of
the mark or continuous use thereof." Thus, it remains to be shown how Article
85 is actually implemented by the Community in order to achieve its desired
goals.
In its earliest cases the Court recognized the futility of prohibiting anticompetitive trademark agreements if the parties were still allowed to benefit from
the undesirable results of these agreements, that is, if they could still use the mark
to partition markets. 7' Thus, Article 85 required a broader interpretation in this
respect. It was necessary to prohibit the results of the agreements as well as the
agreements themselves. In Grundig the registered user's trademark rights were
still valid under French law, despite the EEC's voiding of the agreement. Therefore, the trademark owner was selectively enjoined under Article 85 from enforcing those rights against parallel imports.7 In Sirena the remedy was identical.
The Italian plaintiff was not allowed to assert its trademark rights against imports
marketed by the assignor or other assignees; however, these rights were valid
against third-party infringers.
The development of Article 85's selective injunctions against the enforcement of one's national trademark rights arises out of the European Court's
attempt to reconcile various provisions of the Treaty of Rome. In the earliest
trademark cases, the holders of nationally registered marks argued that Article
85 should not in any way affect the use of their rights pursuant to such registration. They particularly noted that Article 36 specifically upheld import restrictions which were based on the protection of industrial and commercial property.78
That article, however, recognized that such restrictions could not constitute "a
means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade."79 Analogizing a "restriction on trade" to a restriction on competition, the Court consequently concluded that the Treaty would not protect trademark rights when
they affected competition in violation of Article 85.80 It was also urged by trademark proponents that trademark rights could not be tampered with, because the
74 See Grundig II, 5 CoMLs. MKT. L.R. 418, 476 (1966).
75 See Sirena, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
8101, at 7105 (preliminary arguments
advanced by Sirena).
76 Grundig II, 5 CosMi. MKT. L.R. 418, 476 (1966).
77 Id.
78 See note 75 supra. See also Grundig II, 5 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 418, 475-76 (1966).
79 The text of Article 36 provides in part:
The provisions of Articles 30 to 34 shall not preclude prohibitions or restrictions
on imports, exports or goods in transit justified on grounds of . . . the protection of
industrial and commercial property. Such prohibitions or restrictions shall not, however, constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on
trade between Member States.
80 Sirena, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
8101, at 7111.
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Treaty explicitly stated that the property systems of Member States were not to
be prejudiced by EEC law."' The Court, however, responded by stating that
injunctions against the use of one's national property rights merely limit the
exercise of those rights and do not affect their existence." This distinction
between the exercise and the existence of property rights now forms the cornerstone of all EEC cases limiting the enforcement of national trademark protection."
III. Article 36: The EEC's Development of A Potent Weapon Against
Partition of the Common Market
With the development of the EEC's case law, the European Court discovered that Article 85 was an inadequate tool for handling all the situations in
which national trademark protection resulted in the partitioning of the Common
Market. Article 85 is directed toward agreements that restrain competition.
Sometimes, however, an element of agreement may not be present; or if an
agreement does exist, it may not foster a restraint prohibited under Article 85.
Under EEC law, for example, competition is often unaffected by agreements
between a parent company and its wholly owned subsidiaries or by arrangements
between such subsidiaries. This absence of an anticompetitive restraint exists
when the subsidiaries have no real autonomy in determining their market conduct
and when the agreements merely amount to an internal distribution of tasks
within a multinational enterprise.84 Here Article 85 is inapplicable because such
subsidiaries, while having separate legal personalities, may not have economic
autonomy. 8' Thus, by definition, there can be no true competition between
such group members which an agreement might restrict.8 " Article 85, therefore,
cannot be used to strike down trademark agreements between these interdependent members.
This so-called "enterprise entity" doctrine 7 forced the EEC Court into a
position of powerlessness in dealing effectively with national trademark arrangements which divided European markets among present or former members of an
international operation. The Court therefore responded by redefining and
broadening the trademark issue. According to more recent cases, the essence of
the problem with national trademarks is not simply their occasional anticompetitive effect, but rather their general tendency to impair the free movement of
goods within the Community.8"
81 Grundig II, 5 COMM. MKT. L.R. 418, 475-76 (1966). The parties to the agreement
made their argument on the basis of Article 222, which states that the Treaty "shall in no way
prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership."
82 See Grundig II, 5 CosMM. MKT. L.R. 418, 476 '(1966).
83 See generally KORAH, supra note 11, at 181-82.
84 Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
8247, at 9151-68; Imperial Chem. Indus.
Ltd. v. Commission, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
8161, at 8031.
85 See Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8247, at 9151-68; Beguelin Import
Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A., [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH
8149, at 7703-04.
86 Christiani & Nielsen, O.J. No. L 165, at 12 (1969); Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH g 8247, at 9151-77 (opinion of the Advocate General).
87 According to this theory, when "the parent holds the majority of the shares in the
subsidiary and determines the conduct of the subsidiary, they are regarded as 'one economic
unit' and the activities of the subsidiary may be imputed to the parent." J. CUNNNOHAM,
THE COMPETITION LAw OF THE E.E.C. § 3.18, at 24 (Supp. 1975).
88 See Hag, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8230, at 9130 (opinion of the Advocate
General).
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The Court has stated that the concept of "free movement," as expressed in
Articles 30 through 36 of the Treaty, is a fundamental principle of the Common
Market. 9 These articles prohibit quantitative restrictions on imports and exports
and "all measures having an equivalent effect." 90 Trademark laws can have
such restrictive effects when a trademark owner uses national rights to exclude
imports bearing an identical mark. Such exclusion can occur regardless of
whether any anticompetitive agreement exists. Consequently, the principle of
free movement of goods can be applied to enjoin far more trademark practices
than would otherwise be prohibited under Article 85. 9"
A. The Scope of Article 36
The scope of the provisions relating to the free movement of goods is not unlimited. According to Article 36, these rules "shall not preclude prohibitions or
restrictions on imports [or] exports ...

justified on grounds of... the protection

of industrial and commercial property." The second sentence of the article,
however, states that such restrictions shall not "constitute a means of arbitrary
discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between Member States."
Therefore, while trademark laws restricting the free flow of goods between
Member States will still be allowed generally under the Treaty of Rome, they
will not be enforced in every instance.9" From this analysis the Court has concluded, as it did in Grundig and Sirena, that the exercise, but not the existence,
of trademark rights may be affected by the Treaty.9 3
In Article 36 cases, however, a new concept has been introduced by which
the Court has attempted to delimit the proper exercise of the trademark right.
This new formulation permits a trademark owner to-legitimately exclude imports
only when such action is9 necessary to protect those, rights which constitute the
cspecific subject matter" of the property. The origin of this phrase is unexplained. Moreover, a cogent definition of it is lacking in the Court's Article 36
decisions." Instead of fully outlining what the specific subject matter of the
trademark right is, these decisions only tend to indicate instances in which a trademark owner's exercise of national rights will be prevented. In essence, then,
certain rulings merely give a negative definition of this phrase.9" However, the
recent cases still provide the best insight into the European Court's interpretation of Article 36. Consequently, their rationale will be given careful analysis
in this portion of the trademark discussion.
89 Id. at 9124.
90 See, e.g., note 79 supra.
91 See Hag, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8230, at 9130 (opinion of the Advocate General) ; Mak, supra note 6, at 38.
92 See Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8247; Hag, [1974 Transfer Binder]
CCH 8230.
93 Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder) CCH q 8247, at 9151-66; Hag, [1974 Transfer
Binder] CCH ff 8230, at 9124. It has been correctly noted, however, that these decisions have
never satisfactorily explained the basis for the "exercise-existence" distinction. CUNNINGHAM,
suprt note 87, § 8.102.
8247, at 9151-66; Hag, [1974 Transfer
94 Centrafarm, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
Binder] CCH f 8230, at 9124.
95 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 87, §§ 8.135-37.
96 Id.
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B. Ambiguity Concerning the Scope of Article 36 Application:
Van Zuylen Freres v. Hag A.G.
In Van Zuylen Freresv. Hag A.G., a trademark owner was enjoined from
enforcing its rights against certain imports because its trademark and the allegedly
infringing mark had a common origin. The German defendant had once held the
rights for the mark in both Germany and the Benelux countries; subsequently, it
assigned the Belgium and Luxembourg rights to a local subsidiary. During World
War II the subsidiary was sequestrated and the rights were later sold by the
Belgian government to a third party. The third party, in turn, had transferred
the trademark rights to the plaintiff.
Since the original trademark assignment involved the German parent
and its wholly owned subsidiary, under EEC law there was no competition
between the parties which might have been unlawfully restricted.98 The later
separation of the two companies into competing enterprises was insufficient to
transform the original assignment into an anticompetitive scheme, because there
had been no element of agreement between the plaintiff-successor and the
German company.99 Article 85, therefore, was inapplicable to the situation.
Article 36, however, proved more amenable to the Court's purposes. Inasmuch as the exercise of industrial and commercial property rights tended to
partition the Common Market, the free movement of goods between Member
States was directly impaired. The Court concluded that a trademark holder
could not
be permitted to rely on the exclusiveness of a trademark right . . . with a
view to prohibiting the marketing in a Member State of goods legally
produced in another Member State under an identical trademark having
the same origin.' 00
Consequently, the element of common origin, although remote in this instance,
prevented the Belgian concern from enforcing its rights against the German
imports.
Little justification for this decision is given,' and those few principles which
the Court does rely upon only indicate possible further emasculation of the trademark right. The Court takes the view, noted earlier, that Article 36 allows protection of those rights which constitute the specific subject matter of the trademark property. Yet the Court never really undertakes to provide a definition of
the specific subject matter of a trademark. Instead it perfunctorily states that the
prohibition of imports legally bearing a common mark "is incompatible" with
the Article 36 provisions for the free movement of goods.' 2 From this statement
one can only conclude that, whatever the specific subject matter of a trademark

97
98
99
100

101

102

[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
Id. at 9124, 9129-30 (opinions
Id.
Id. at 9125.
See, e.g., CUNNINGHAM, supra
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH f

8230.
of the EEC Court and the Advocate General).
note 87, §§ 8.54H, 8.133 et seq.
8230, at 9125.
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is, it apparently does not require
protection which is incompatible with the pro10 3
visions for free movement.
Yet if this is the case, then the reasoning of the Hag Court is tautologous.
Its decision is founded exclusively on the principle of free movement of goods.
The scope of that principle is limited, or defined, only by concepts, such as the
specific subject matter, which are largely "explained" in terms of the principle
itself. Thus, the Court does not actually advance or elucidate its position any
further than to state its conclusion that the plaintiff's particular actions are in
violation of the principle of free movement.0 4
This single-minded emphasis on ensuring the free movement of goods is
disturbing. Since the Court recognizes that the ordinary exercise of a national
trademark right often frustrates such free movement, commentators have begun
to fear the possibility of an EEC decision enjoining the enforcement of a national
trademark right despite the absence of a common origin for the domestic and
foreign marks." 5 This view is further supported by the language of the Hag
Court in the one instance in which it did attempt to elucidate the specific subject
matter of the trademark right: It stated that national trademark law, "at any
rate protects the legitimate holder of a trademark against infringement on the
part of persons who lack any legal title."'0 0 If, in the Court's view, this is to be
the full extent of national trademark protection, then perhaps imports bearing a
foreign mark identical to a domestic mark will be permitted to enter a Member
State whenever the foreign mark has been lawfully affixed in another Member
State. 7 Thus, provided the "infringing" marks are lawfully applied somewhere
in the EEC, Article 36 would be applicable without a finding of common origin.
The far reaching views set forth above have been countered by more recent
interpretations of the Hag decision as an aberration in Community trademark
law which will seldom, if ever, again occur.'
This position is supported by a
closer reading of the precedent upon which Hag was mistakenly premised and
103 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 87, §§ 8.135-36. It should be noted, however, that in
the EEC's most recent case, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer
& Co., CCH
8362, at 7606 (1976), the Court refers to both the "specific subject matter"
of the trademark property and the trademark's "basic function" of indicating origin. Thus,
while the analysis of this area is still extremely weak, this new case may indicate that the
"specific subject matter" of the trademark property will be defined as the right to take actions
which will ensure that the "basic function" of the trademark is protected.
104 See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 87, §§ 8.135-36. It should be noted that in Terrapin,
supra note 103, the Court has apparently sought to offer a more reasonable explanation for
the doctrine of "common origin" espoused in Hag. In Terrapin, the Court stated that in those
cases in which the ownership of a common mark is divided, "the basic function of the trademark of guaranteeing to consumers that the product has the same origin is already undermined
by the [voluntary or involuntary] subdivision of the original right." However, if the Court is
seriously attempting to preserve the origin-indicating function of trademarks, then once a
common mark has come to represent the separate business goodwills of separate owners, the
allowance of commonly branded imports would only further dilute that function. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 87, § 8.138-.39. But see 1 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 15.5, at 467-75 (3d ed. 1967).
105 See Ladas, The Court of Justice of the European Community and the "Hag" Case,
5 I.I.C. 302 (1974); Mann, Industrial Property and the E.E.C. Treaty, 24 INT'L. & COMP.
L.Q. 31, 40 (1975).
106 [1974] Transfer Binder] CCH
8230, at 9125 '(emphasis added).
107 Ladas, supra note 105, at 309-11.
108 See EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., [1976] Pat. Cas. 1 (1975).
See generally KORAH, supra note 11, at 225-26.

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1977]

by an analysis of Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V., 0 9 which followed shortly
after Hag. Initially, it is clear from the arguments advanced by the Advocate
General in Hag that the Court's decision was based on analogies drawn from the
EEC's first Article 36 commercial property case, Deutsche Grammophon
Gesselschaft mbh v. Metro-SB-Grssmarkte Gmbh."' Those analogies, however, were incorrect. In Deutsche Grammophon the plaintiff was a German
record producer which marketed its goods abroad through various sales subsidiaries. Some of the records distributed by its French subsidiary were eventually
shipped back into Germany and sold by the defendant, whereupon the plaintiff
brought suit for infringement of its German copyright. On reference, the EEC
Court held that the plaintiff's actions did not violate Article 85, since the requisite
element of agreement was not present. The plaintiff's exercise of its national
industrial property rights involved purely unilateral conduct. Article 36, however, was found to be violated. The owner of a national copyright could not use
that right to prohibit the importation of products distributed by the holder or by
those acting with its consent.'
Relying on these principles, the Hag Court asserted that a national trademark owner could not exercise his rights to prohibit importation of goods bearing
a trademark of the same origin."' Unfortunately, though, the Court's reliance
was misplaced. The Deutsche Grammophon decision was premised on the element of consent by the copyright owner; but, as one German commentator has
noted, in Hag there was no consent:
[C]onsent cannot be inferred from the mere fact that the marks in the exporting and the importing country [sic] have a common origin. In the Hag
case any suggestion of consent was negatived 3by the circumstances in which
they [the opposing companies] became split."
Given this obvious absence of consent, it is no wonder that the Court
relied on a theory of "common origin" in order to apply Article 36.
absence of consent is the very reason why the Deutsche Grammophon
failed. More importantly, because of that absence, the circumstances
presented a clear case of unlawful infringement.

in Hag
Yet the
analogy
in Hag

C. Tempering the Hag case-Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V.
The question raised following Hag, of course, is whether or not the European
Court will return to the principles espoused in Deutsche Grammophon before
granting further injunctions against trademark enforcement. If this earlier
precedent is followed, it is unlikely that the Court will enjoin an infringement
suit unless the challenged imports bear an identical mark affixed by the local
trademark owner or with his consent. If, however, the Hag doctrine prevails,
then a showing of common origin for the foreign and domestic marks may be
109
110
111
112
113

[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH J 8247.
[1971-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH ff 8106.
Id. at 7193.
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH J 8230, at 9125.
Mann, supra note 105, at 40.
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sufficient to warrant an injunction against the assertion of domestic rights. Moreover, if Hag's unmitigated reliance on the principle of free movement is extended
to its logical conclusion, then perhaps even the showing of common origin will
not be necessary for application of Article 36.114
An ambiguous, but nevertheless encouraging response"1 to these various
alternatives was provided by the Court in Centrafarm B.V. v. Winthrop B.V."l
There the judges returned to the language of Deutsche Grammophon in holding
that a Dutch company could not assert its domestic trademark rights to oppose
imports into Holland which had been sold abroad under an identical mark by the
British parent company. The British company itself was controlled by an American corporation; thus, both of the European operations were members of a
multinational enterprise.
Since the British, Dutch and other European members of the group held
rights to the common mark in their respective countries, it was charged that the
existence of these parallel rights among group members was a concerted practice
in violation of Article 85. The Court implied, however, that even if this constellation of trademark holdings did constitute a concerted practice there was still
no infringement of the EEC's antitrust laws. When the various members of a
group lack economic and marketing autonomy, and when their separate national
ownership of trademarks results merely from an internal allocation of tasks among
members of a group, Article 85 is inapplicable, since the allocation does not, in
fact, affect competition." 7
The Court did find, however, that the Dutch subsidiary's exclusionary use
of its trademark violated Article 36. In so holding, the Court expressly defined for
the first time the specific subject matter of the trademark right: It was designed to
legally ensure to the holder the exclusive right to use the mark for initial circulation of his goods on the market, thereby protecting the holder against unlawful
users."' The judges in Centrafarm noted, though, that a mark could not be used
by its holder, or one acting under his authorization, as a tool for partitioning the
Common Market. Thus, the Court specifically stated that
[t]he exercise, by the owner of a trademark, of the right he enjoys under the
legislation of one Member State to prohibit the sale, in that State, of a
product that has been marketed under the trademark in another Member
State by the trademark owner or with his consent is incompatible with the
rules of the EEC Treaty concerning the free movement of goods within the
Common Market. 119
Clearly, the nominal trademark holder here was the plaintiff, the Dutch subsidiary. Since this company did not actually consent to the use of its mark abroad
by the British parent, it has been argued that the above quoted doctrine should
not have prevented the exclusion of the "infringing" British goods.' ° The Court's
114
115
116
117
118
119

See text accompanying notes 100-07 supra.
See, e.g., KORAH, supra note 11, at 225-26.
8247.
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH
Id. at 9151-68. See text accompanying notes 84-87 supra.
[1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8247, at 9151-66.
Id. at 9151-68.
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CUNNINGHAM,

supra note 87, § 8.144.
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analysis, however, apparently penetrated the legal fiction of independent corporate entities and viewed the Dutch subsidiary and its English parent as a single
entity. 2' Consequently, the same organization that marketed the goods in one
Member State was seen to be opposing the entrance of those goods into another
Member State where it also controlled the local trademark rights. In short, the
British parent, as the ultimate trademark owner, was using its Dutch rights to
exclude from Holland drugs which it had already marketed in England.
Thus, the difference between Centrafarm and Deutsche Grammophon is
that in the latter case the Court viewed the German plaintiff as opposing the
reimportationof goods which had been marketed abroad with its consent. There,
of course, the foreign marketing had also been accomplished through a wholly
controlled subsidiary. Since such control did exist, the Court could have
applied the rationale used in Centrafarm by viewing the parent and subsidiary
as a single entity for trademark purposes. Thus, the foreign marketing would
have constituted circulation by the owner itself, and the incoming goods would,
likewise, have been allowed. However, when the marketing is done by more
autonomous subsidiaries, or by completely independent third parties, then the
only avenue of approach under Article 36 is to demonstrate that such activities
are engaged in with the consent of the original trademark owner. Only then will
the latter individual be precluded from obstructing the entrance of identically
marked imports.
By specifically requiring that imports be marketed by the trademark owner
or with its consent before Article 36 could apply, the Centrafarm decision offered
much needed reassurance to the proponents of national trademark protection."2
In its ruling the Court could have easily relied on the doctrine of "common
origin," which it had so recently conjured up in the Hag opinion. However, that
new doctrine played no role in the Centrafarm holding. Instead, the Court continually referred to the determinative fact that the imported goods had been
marketed "by the trademark holder or with its consent." Admittedly, the
presence of such consent necessarily implies some type of common origin for a
mark. However, the converse is not always true; as in Hag, the presence of a
common origin for the trademark does not ensure the existence of consent as to
its use by one of the parties."' Thus, the circumstances in Hag should not be
analogized to those in Deutsche Grammophon; contrastingly, the facts in Centrafarm are quite analogous. Perhaps the Court's substitution of "consent" for
"common origin" in this case merely resulted from the fact that the existence of
consent is an unambiguous manifestation of common origin and, therefore, the
use of the former term adds more force and legitimacy to the Court's decision.
Clearly, the Court did not claim to overrule Hag, so whether it will now require
the higher standard of consent before it will apply Article 36 in the future is an
open question." 4 The obvious difference in terminology, however, is encouraging
for the proponents of trademark protection.
121 Id. § 8.54G.
122 See KORAH, supra note 11, at 225-26.
123 See Mann, supra note 105, at 40.
124 In the more recent case, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A.
Kapferer & Co., CCH [ 8362, at 7605 (1976), the EEC Court stated that a trademark holder
cannot rely on national legislation to exclude similarly marked imports when
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D. Limiting the Scope of the Principleof Free Movement of Goods
Even if it cannot be determined from Centralarm whether the higher standard of consent will be imposed before trademark enforcement is enjoined, some
tentative conclusions have been drawn from this case concerning the scope of the
earlier Hag decision. A prominent British commentator has stated that, in light
of Centrafarm, the Hag decision's great emphasis on the free movement of goods
may at least be limited to cases of true "common origin."' 25 Thus, there is less
fear that the EEC Court will allow goods to enter a trademark holder's territory
simply because they have been lawfully marked in another Member State. 2 ' This
view is sustained by the fact that in Centrafarm's companion case," concerning
a similar abusive use of patents, the Court stated that when two "original [patent]
owners are legally and economically independent" of each other the domestic
patentee may exclude goods manufactured by the foreign patentee.' 28 Since the
Centrafarm v. Winthrop case says nothing to the contrary regarding trademarks,
it may well be that two independent trademark owners can successfully oppose
one another's imports, even though their goods have been lawfully marked in
their respective countries. 9 Consequently, the Hag decision would not have the
drastic effects which were once anticipated."'
In light of the Centrafarm decision, a member of the British bench has also
suggested that Hag be "regarded as a special case limited by its own unusual

facts.""' In EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd.," 2 Justice Graham
acknowledged that the factor of previous common origin and the "paramount
importance of free circulation" were decisive in the Hag case. Yet he believed
that the more recent Centrafarm decision might in fact be an expression of a new,
stricter approach to the EEC Court's handling of parallel imports. Since
Centralarm only allowed such imports when they were placed on the market in
another Member State by the trademark owner or with his consent, Justice
Graham believed that this later EEC decision might involve an implicit corollary:
[A] person owning a trade mark in a member state "A" and member state
"B" can prevent importation of goods bearing the mark into state "A" from
state "B" if the goods have not been put on the market in state "B" with the
trade mark on them, either by the trade mark owner or with his consent. In
that event the doctrines of common origin and exhaustion of rights do
not apply and there is no attempt being made to "carve up the market" by
means of the trade marks. All the trade mark owner is doing is to exercise
in state "A" a right which forms the specific subject matter of his property
the right relied on is the result of the subdivision, either by voluntary act or as a
result of public constraint, of a trademark right which originally belonged to
one and the same proprietor.
This statement by the Court would seem to indicate that it will continue to apply the
lesser standard of common origin when the element of consent is not present. Nevertheless,
this statement is only dictum in the Terrapin case, so it is still unclear whether the Court will
ultimately resolve the matter in favor of the higher standard of consent.
125 KORA-, supra note 11, at 225-26.
126 See text accompanying notes 100-07 supra.
127 Centrafarm B.V. v. Sterling Drug Inc., [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH % 8246.
128 Id. at 9151-56.
129 CUNNINGHAM, supra note 87, § 8.56; KORAH, supra note 11, at 225-26.
130 Id.
131 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., [1976] Pat. Cas. 1, 15 (1975).
132 [1976] Pat. Cas. 1 (1975).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 19771

in state "A," namely the trade mark. He is entitled in such circumstances
to prevent in state "A" a fraudulent imitation or action which may lead to
doubt as to the origin or quality of the goods.133
The Justice concluded that if this was the result which the EEC intended by its
Centrafarm decision, then Hag should be narrowly circumscribed to those relatively infrequent situations involving the previous common ownership .r origin
of a mark. The case should not be viewed as pointing the "way to a further
'
extension of the doctrine of free circulation of goods."134
Unfortunately, though, when the EMI case recently came before the EEC
Court,13 5 that tribunal failed to deal with the validity of Justice Graham's
remarks. The facts of the case did not compel a decision as to whether Hag
should be limited solely to cases of common origin or broadened to include all
inhibitions on the free movement of goods bearing trademarks lawfully affixed in
one of the Member States. Because the circumstances indicated that there were
no inhibitions at all on the free movement of goods between Member States, the
question as to the necessity for demonstrating the element of common origin
became moot.
In EMI the plaintiff was the owner of the COLUMBIA trademark in all
the countries of the Common Market. The defendant, on the other hand, was
the British subsidiary of an American corporation which held the rights to the
COLUMBIA mark in the United States and in many other non-EEC nations.
Since all the rights to the mark had once been under common ownership, the
British defendant claimed that it was entitled, under the Hag doctrine of common
ownership, to import goods from the American parent labelled in the United
States with the COLUMBIA mark.
The Court stated, however, that Articles 30 through 36 only prohibited
restrictions on trade between Member States:
Accordingly, the exercise of a trademark right in order to prevent the marketing of products coming from a third country [the United States] under an
identical mark, even if this constitutes a measure having an effect equivalent
to a quantitative restriction, does not affect the free movement of goods
between Member States and thus does not come under the prohibitions set
out in Articles 30 et seq. of the Treaty. In such circumstances the exercise of
a trademark right does not jeopardize the unity of the Common Market
which Articles 30 et seq. are intended to ensure."'
Seemingly, this position should be modified, however, when the Court
is faced with certain circumstances outlined earlier in the Article 85 discussion.
If a trademark holder in a third country also owns subsidiaries in several EEC
countries, then the inability of those subsidiaries to import the owner's goods under
the common mark might not only affect trade between Member States for purposes of Article 85," but it might well tend to hinder the free movement of
133
134
135
136
137

Id. at 15-16.
Id.
EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., CCH %8350 (1976).
Id. at 7362 (emphasis added).
See text accompanying notes 37-39 supra.
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goods between such states for purposes of Article 36. In EMI the Court mentioned the possible "effect on trade" in such circumstances, "8 but for unknown
reasons it neglected to note a possible "free movement" violation as well. If the
latter had been present, then it seems logical that the doctrine of common origin
should have been applied.
The EMI case did demonstrate that when harm to the free movement of
goods between Member States cannot be shown, then Article 36 is inapplicable
and any examination of the common origin of the litigious marks is totally irrelevant.139 Consequently, in EMI the Court effectively limited the possible application of the doctrine of common origin to those situations involving the prohibition of imports from other Member States.'
It should be noted, however, that the EMI decision did not resolve the
question raised in Hag, and only impliedly answered in Centrafarm, as to whether
a showing of common origin will still be necessary for an infringement of Article
36 if the requisite harm to the free movement of goods can, in fact, be demonstrated. As noted earlier, the exercise of the rights of an independent national
trademark holder to oppose imports of similarly or identically branded items,
marketed by an independent holder in another state, will obviously hinder the
free movement of goods between countries. Yet if the parties' marks are without
common origin, it would seem that, under a literal interpretation of Hag,
Article 36 would not apply.
After much debate, this view has been conclusively sustained in the EEC's
most recent trademark case, Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie
C.A. Kapferer & Co.' There the Court specifically held that Article 36 would
not preclude the owner of a valid German trademark from opposing similar
goods imported under a confusingly similar English mark,
provided that there are no agreements restricting competition and no legal
[national
or economic ties between the undertakings and that their respective
4 2
trademark] rights have arisen independently of one another.
In short, it now appears that at least some demonstration of common origin is
an essential element to finding an Article 36 violation. Where trademark owners,
like the patent owners hypothesized in Centrafarm's companion case against
'
of one another,
Sterling Drug,'43 are "legally and economically independent"144
this important element cannot be shown. Thus, the fears arising from Hag's
extreme emphasis on the principle of free movement have been greatly allayed
by this new ruling. While it is still uncertain whether the EEC will eventually
require the higher standard of "consent," rather than "common origin," it is at
least apparent that the exclusionary use of national trademark rights will not be
altogether prohibited.
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IV. Summary: The EEC's Application of Articles 85 and 36
Although the EEC Court's most recent Article 36 decisions in the trademark
area still leave some questions unanswered, they do provide a useful summary
of the EEC's current application of Treaty provisions to the enforcement of
national trademark rights. First, it should be clear that Article 36, with its
emphasis on ensuring the free movement of goods within the Community, will
now be the primary tool used by the EEC in trademark controversies. Unlike
Article 85, the elements of agreement and of anticompetitive object or effect
need not be shown in order to establish a violation. Consequently, even the unilateral exercise of one's trademark rights can be prevented under this provision. 4"
A domestic trademark owner who markets goods abroad under a domestic mark,
or one similar thereto, cannot oppose the reimportation of those goods onto the
home market. The items have been initially circulated by the trademark owner
himself and, therefore, his rights to trademark protection have been fully implemented. Moreover, under the EEC's doctrine of "enterprise entity" the
members of an interdependent economic group will be viewed as forming a single
unit for trademark purposes.4 As in Centrafarm, when a subsidiary holds the
rights to a national mark, such ownership will be attributed to the parent and
the other members of the group. Foreign sales of goods under the common mark
by any member will be viewed as sales undertaken by the local member himself.
Thus, the latter member will be unable to employ his national trademark rights to
oppose the resale of these goods on his own market. Additionally, of course,
under Article 36 a trademark owner cannot oppose imports of identically branded
goods which have been circulated abroad by third parties with the consent of the
owner.
The principles cited above are those extracted from Centrafarm and
Deutsche Grammophon and they apply to situations "where the marks in the
47
importing and exporting Member States are both owned by the same person"
or multinational entity. Contrastingly, under Centrafarm and Terrapin, it appears that if two trademark owners in separate Member States are "legally and
economically independent" of each other, they can normally oppose one another's
imports, though under similar or identical marks. 1 8 Nonetheless, an important
caveat remains. If the identical though independent marks have a common
origin, then the principles espoused in Hag will apply when both parties own
their marks within the Community. In this case, the individuals will be prevented from opposing one another's imports, even if the transfer of rights to one
of them was involuntary, as in Hag. 49 Under the doctrine of common origin,
therefore, Sirena and Grundig situations may be easily handled without resort to
When rights to the same mark are
notions of anticompetitive agreement.'5
assigned or otherwise transferred to independent businesses in separate Member
145
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States, those enterprises will be prevented from exercising their national trademark rights in contravention of the principle of free movement of goods between
Member States.
From this analysis it appears that the exercise of national trademark rights
within the EEC can be prevented solely by relying on Article 36. As EMI pointed
out, however, this will not be the case when, despite the presence of a common
origin in the marks, one party is located outside the Community. s' In those
circumstances there is no restriction on the free movement of goods between
Member States, but only between the Community and third-party nations. It is
possible, though, that these circumstances will present an Article 85 violation.
In EMI the Court stated that
[a] restrictive agreement between traders within the Common Market and
competitors in third countries that would bring about an isolation of the
Common Market as a whole which, in the territory of the Community, would
reduce the supply of products originating in third countries which are
similar to those protected by a mark within the Community, might be of
such a nature as to
affect adversely the conditions of competition within the
15 2
Common Market.
A further reason explaining continued reliance on Article 85 is that by granting the Commission automatic jurisdiction over competition violations, the antitrust provisions of the Treaty help to ensure prompt action against alleged trademark abuses. Requests for injunctions against identically marked goods may
violate either Article 36 or Article 85, or both. Such requests will usually be
made in the lower courts of a Member State. If they are improperly granted
in violation of Article 36, it is possible that the EEC, through its Court of Justice,
may not deal with the trademark questions until the case reaches the highest
court in the member nation.' 3 Obviously, this process can be very time consuming.
If, on the other hand, an Article 85 violation appears to exist, the EEC Commission has jurisdiction to deal with the matter immediately. Unlike the Court,
it can investigate and issue a form of "cease and desist" order on the request of
the aggrieved individual or on its own initiative."' Thus, when violations of
Article 85 are discovered, improper injunctions or other illicit actions against the
importation of identically marked goods may sometimes be ended more readily
than if EEC Court rulings are sought under an Article 36 violation. For these
reasons it is suggested that the EEC will continue to employ Article 85, in addition to using Article 36, to strike down national trademark protection.
V. The Conflict Between the EEC's Trademark Decisions and the Traditional
Theory of the Trademark Function
The preceding discussion has sought to explain and interpret the EEC's
151 See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra.
152 EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., CCH f 8350, at 7363 (1976).
153 See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra, for a discussion of the Court's jurisdiction.
See generally KORAH, supra note 11, at 224.
154 See Article 89. For an example of the Commission's most recent case in this area, see
Advocaat Zwarte Kip, Soenen-Bouckaert v. Cinoco SA and Van Olffen VB, 13(11) CoSIM.
MXT. L.R. D79 (1974).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

[April 1977]

recent trademark decisions and to predict, to some extent, the lines along which
EEC trademark law will continue to develop. No study of this body of law would
be complete, however, without analyzing the Community decisions in light of the
role which trademarks have traditionally played in commerce. For this reason,
those cases already noted will be viewed again, under a different and perhaps
more critical eye. It will become readily apparent that after the EEC's initial
decision in Grundig, the Court soon began to disregard the importance of trademarks for both businessmen and consumers.
According to traditional theory a trademark has a dual function which must
be fulfilled. The primary purpose of a trademark is to indicate the origin of a
product and distinguish it from other products of the same type. In this sense a
trademark represents the business goodwill of its owner. Additionally, a trademark serves as a guarantee of quality to the consumer.'
In order to effectuate
this dual function, the laws of all countries recognize "the exclusive right of the
proprietor to use his trademark and to exclude others from such use .... This is

the recognition of a property right in the trademark.""' That right, in turn, can
be transferred, with the effect that an assignee will gain exclusive use of the mark
and the ability to prevent others from using that mark or a similar infringing
one."' In certain cases this exclusivity of a mark will be denied, due to antitrust
violations arising from the actual function which a particular trademark performs." 8 Thus, even under traditional theory, if a trademark is being used as a
vehicle for anticompetitive practices, the mark will be denied protection. In most
other cases, however, the exclusivity of a mark will be respected so that its dual
function can be carried out.
Given this emphasis on inquiring into the actual use of a mark, it can at
least be said that the EEC's first trademark case, Grundig, was properly decided
under traditional theory. The transfer of the secondary trademark GINT was not
designed to indicate a new origin or quality guarantee resting with the French
distributor. There was no legitimate assignment of the owner's goodwill." 9 The
primary mark GRUNDIG continued to indicate that the origin and quality
guarantee of the imported products lay with the German manufacturer.'
Thus, the assignment of the secondary mark was merely intended to partition the
Common Market by giving the French distributor control over the entry of
Grundig products into France.'' Realizing this anticompetitive perversion of the
trademark's legitimate function, the EEC Court correctly denied protection to
the GINT mark. 2
In later cases, however, it has been the Court, and not the parties holding the
trademark rights, that has ignored the proper function of a trademark. As a
result, trademark protection which would clearly have been granted under traditional theory has been refused. In Sirena, for example, the Court enjoined the
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Italian assignee's infringement action against identically marked imports of different origin and composition, without demonstrating or even referring to anticompetitive intent among the parties to the trademark assignment." 3 Consequently, after thirty-four years of certainty, Italian consumers could no longer
rely on the indication of origin and quality represented by the plaintiff's mark.'
Moreover, the goodwill of the plaintiff was jeopardized, since foreign assignees
could now freely take advantage of the Italian producer's reputation in their own
marketing and advertising activities." 5
The rationale for the Court's action was that Article 85 should be governed
by the same principles as Article 36, to the extent that industrial property rights
should not be protected when used as a means of "arbitrary discrimination or
as a disguised restriction on trade." In Grundig the use of the GINT mark was,
in fact, a disguised restriction on trade.' 6 In Sirena, however, the plaintiff's
trademark appeared to have a very legitimate purpose. If the Court did give
weight to evidence of the plaintiff's anticompetitive intentions, then surely the
decision should have noted this fact.1 7 If, on the other hand, the Court intended
that all trademark assignments involving more than one Member State be
prohibited as producing inherently anticompetitive effects, then the decision
ignored a fundamental principle of trademark theory. Trademarks, by their very
nature, are designed to be exclusive.' 8 This exclusivity prevents competitors from
using the mark, but it does not prevent them from selling competing goods under
a different mark.6 9 Thus, if the function of the trademark in Sirena was as
legitimate as it appeared to be, the plaintiff-assignee's right of exclusivity should
have been protected.
The failure of the European Court to implement common notions of trademark law is more fully demonstrated by its decision in Hag. In this case imports
of potentially different composition, produced by an independent foreign enterprise, were freely allowed to circulate on the plaintiff's market under identical
trademarks. In its decision the Court itself admitted that trademarks carry out
an important function of indicating product origin."' Nevertheless, the judges
argued that consumers could be informed by supplementary labelling which,
1
presumably, would indicate both the producer and country of origin.
Suspect, though, is whether the Court's expectation that consumers will
carefully read labels is not pure naivete. As one British authority remarked,
[t]he Court of Justice would appear to have been possessed by a romantic
vision of the perfect Common Market shopper, who notes
the sources of all
72
his purchases and studies the contents of every label.'
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However, if the Court and Commission were really convinced that consumers
would carefully read labels "so as to disabuse themselves of false expectations
evoked by their 'brand loyalty,' " then these institutions would "doubtless not
be so anxious to ensure that similarly marked products should be allowed to appear on the same market."'17 3 Similarly, it is ironic that the Advocate General
in Hag should urge that the German defendant be allowed to use its HAG mark
in the Benelux market on the grounds that its export mark DECOFA had made
little headway there. 7 1 In making these arguments he was acknowledging the
substantial effects which successful branding by the Benelux plaintiff had produced." The Benelux consumers had apparently developed a strong loyalty for
the local HAG brand and could not be persuaded to buy the defendant's
DECOFA, regardless of any supplementary information borne on the label.
Such facts obviously raise serious doubts about the EEC's vision of the "well
read consumer."
Fortunately the Court's recent decision in Centrafarm seems to indicate a
more realistic concern for avoiding consumer deception. However, instead of
adopting the traditional theory of fulfillment of the trademark function, the
Court implicitly accepted the so-called exhaustion of rights theory."G Under
this view the trademark owner's national rights are deemed to be exhausted once
items have been initially circulated under the mark by the owner or by those
applying the mark with his consent. 17 Thus, if the owner markets brands abroad
by himself or through an assignee or licensee, he has exhausted his domestic
trademark rights and cannot prevent the resale of those goods on the home
market. In some cases the results achieved from the implementation of this approach will coincide with the application of traditional trademark theory. In
many situations, however, the function of a particular mark will not be fulfilled
under Centrafarm'sexhaustion principles.
The traditional trademark function is carried out under Centrafarm in situations in which the trademark owners in the importing and exporting Member
States are legally and economically independent of each other. According to the
court's exhaustion theory, it seems that owners of identical marks who do not
derive their rights from one another or from assignments by the same person,
may legally oppose one another's imports."' Under the additional theory of
"enterprise entity," however, control of one trademark holder by another can
result in attribution of the former's trademark ownership to the latter." 9 Thus,
an infringement action by either party may be viewed as unwarranted opposition by the ultimate trademark owner to the importation of its own goods. Therefore, to exclude infringing imports marketed by one another, the trademark
owners must not only derive their rights independently, but they must also be
legally and economically separate from one another. If these conditions are met
173 Cornish, Patents, Trade Marks, Copyright, 1975 J. Bus. L. 50, 55.
174 Hag, [1974 Transfer Binder] CCH 1 8230, at 9132.
175 Cornish, supra note 173, at 55 n.32.
176 See generally EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom Ltd., [1976] Pat. Cas. 1
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the Court will allow the parties to bring national infringement proceedings to
prevent deception concerning the origin and quality of goods bearing their
In this way the traditional function of their trademarks will still be
mark.'
fulfilled under EEC law.
Similarly, the Centralarm doctrine is in accord with the theory of the fulfillment of the trademark function in cases in which the imported goods are genuine.
As noted earlier, Centratarm holds that a trademark owner who markets abroad
items identical to those sold at home cannot oppose the resale of these items on
its domestic market. Under these circumstances products bearing the mark are
not deceptive in their origin or quality, for they are the same items as those
originally sold at home. They are genuine. Consequently, such importation,
sanctioned by the Centrafarm decision, does not conflict with traditional trademark theory.'
Under traditional theory, however, there are other patterns of accepted
trademark use which would not be allowed under the approach taken in
Centrafarm. A prominent international trademark authority notes, for example,
that
[t]he owner of the trademark, to satisfy local requirements of the public's
taste or preferences or the requirements of a country's health law or other
legislation, may not put on sale the identical goods in the two separate
countries in which he owns the trademark. Indeed, the separate goodwills
he has acquired in the two countries may have been built up to symbolize
products having two different sets of characteristics. In such case importation
of the product of one country into the other may interfere with the very
function of the trademark by creating confusion of the public as to the
identity of the goods2 by injuring the separate goodwill that the owner has in
the latter country.'1
Thus, the application of Centrafarm's principles may clearly result in the
entry of imports which are not manufactured for a local market. This can occur
under the circumstances described above, in which the owner of trademarks for
two or more Member States sells distinct products in each of the states and
thereby develops a separate goodwill for the various markets. Additionally, under
Centrafarm, identically branded imports may gain entry when the trademark
owner in one Member State assigns his trademark and his separate goodwill for
a second Member State. Thereafter, the goods of the assignee, though marketed
in the second state with the consent of the assignor, may vary in composition
from those items sold by the assignor on his home market. In both examples,
then, the entry of these distinct, though identically marked imports onto the
domestic market may result in consumer deception as to product origin and
quality. That, in turn, may lead to a loss of the trademark owner's local goodwill.
Thus, it should be obvious that the principles of exhaustion espoused in
Centrafarm are still at variance with the traditional theory of fulfillment of the
trademark function.' 8' Centrafarm clearly represents a step forward from Sirena
180
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and Hag in terms of the EEC's respect for national trademark protection, but that
step has not been well guided. While the principles of Centrafarm inadvertently
protect the trademarks' function when the owners of the litigious marks are legally
and economically independent of each other or when the imported goods are
genuine, those principles have not been developed with the specific intent to
preserve the trademark function.184 Consequently, under EEC law, even when
there is no anticompetitive action in violation of the Grundig holding, it is still
quite possible for a trademark owner to be prevented from acting against those
who are damaging the function of his mark. If he cannot properly exclude the
importation of identically or similarly branded goods, consumers may be deceived
as to the origin and quality of their purchases and a loss of business goodwill may
result.
VI. Conclusion
Because the EEC is an international community, its goal of economic integration has been peculiarly inhibited by the presence of national trademark
legislation. In response to the disruptive effect which such laws may have on
intrabrand competition or on the free movement of goods between Member
States, the EEC Court and Commission have taken bold steps under Articles 85
and 36 to enjoin national trademark protection in several situations.
When the exercise of a trademark right has an effect on trade between
Member States and results from an agreement whose object or effect is a restriction on competition, then enforcement of the right many be selectively prohibited. Since the Court has interpreted the "object or effect" requirement of
Article 85 in the disjunctive, apparently innocent assignment agreements may be
outlawed simply because they inherently result in the exclusion of goods branded
by a foreign assignor or foreign assignees. This expansive application of the anticompetition articles seems to reject the Court's initial indications that trademark
protection would be denied only when a mark was abusively exploited by its
owner.
Article 85, however, only deals with restrictions on competition; other areas
of EEC case law expressly hold that competition does not exist between wholly
controlled, non-autonomous members of a multinational organization. Thus, the
ownership of trademark rights by such subsidiaries in different Member States
may result in exclusion of one another's imports, but it will not technically result
in a restriction on competition. Furthermore, Article 85's requisite element of
agreement cannot be demonstrated when a national trademark owner, whether
independent or wholly controlled, unilaterally acts to oppose imports originally
marketed by the owner itself or with its authority. Consequently, the Court has
shifted its reliance to Article 36 and the broader principle of free movement.
In its claimed reliance on this principle, the Court first pronounced the
doctrine of common origin in Hag. The absence of a logical underpinning for
this doctrine aroused fear that perhaps trademark protection would be sacrificed
184 The EEC's recent Terrapin case, CCH fl 8362, at 7605 (1976), at least makes mention
of protecting the origin-indicating function of a mark. Yet, as emphasized in note 104 supra,
the Court's methods do not seem properly designed to ensure such protection.
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to the principle of free movement in all cases of legally marked imports, regardless
of any element of common origin. Such suspicions have been greatly allayed
with the Centrafarm and Terrapin decisions upholding continued protection for
legally and economically independent trademark owners and simply indicating
that proprietors of a trademark cannot prohibit identically branded imports
labelled by the proprietors themselves or under their authority. At present, this
doctrine of exhaustion or consent and the doctrine of common origin both seem
to be upheld by the Court. 8 ' It remains to be seen, then, whether the EEC will
do away with the doctrine of common origin and rely solely on the principles of
exhaustion espoused in Centrafarm.
Regardless of that decision, however, it seems that the Court has now
departed too greatly from traditional trademark theories to ever return. Though
the holding in Centrafarm protects the dual function of the trademark in some
instances, the decision is not, in fact, designed with the protection of that function
in mind. When an individual owns the same mark in two countries and sells
distinct goods in each market, or when he assigns one of his trademarks to another
individual, cross-importation of dissimilar, though identically branded goods
cannot be prevented. Thus, in many cases consumer confusion and loss of goodwill are the inevitable results.
Unfortunately, these disturbing effects have been consistently ignored or
denied by the Court. Recent trademark decisions have been cloaked in language
and logic that presumes a perfectly informed consumer. Instead of realistically admitting that confusion and damage may occur as a result of the EEC's
quest for economic unity and expected price reductions for consumers, the Court
continues to rely on obvious fictions. It is submitted, then, that in future cases it
would at least be wise for the Court to admit that EEC purchasers can and are
being confused by the relaxation of trademark protection and that a balance of
interests has indeed been drawn.'
Craig C. Rice
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